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I hope that some people see some connection between the two
topics in the title [viz., naming and necessity]. If not, anyway,
such connections will be developed in the course of these talks.
Furthermore, because of the use of tools involving reference
and necessity in analytic philosophy today, our views on these
topics really have wide-ranging implications for other problems
in philosophy that traditionally might be thought far-removed,
like arguments over the mind-body problem or the so-called
‘identity thesis’. Materialism, in this form, often now gets
involved in very intricate ways in questions about what is
necessary or contingent in identity of properties – questions
like that. So, it is really very important to philosophers who
may want to work in many domains to get clear about these
concepts.
—Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 22–23 (first paragraph
of lecture 1).
I am offered a trade: instead of a multiplicity of kinds of thing I
can have a multiplicity of counterpart relations.
—David Lewis, “Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies”,
p. 53.
1. Introduction
Consider a physicalist about the human mind who defends a claim
like (1):
(1) Pain = c-fiber firing.1
1. I follow the custom of letting “c-fiber firing” stand in for whatever the
physicalist thinks pain is. As will become clear, the discussion would be
little changed if a functional state were substituted, since (i) functionalists
are committed to property identities (on pain of property dualism); and (ii)
there are modal arguments that target such identity claims. For example,
the possibility of zombies would motivate the analog of premise (2) (below)
with respect to functionalist identity claims. Block’s China body system
(Block 1980) explicitly targets functionalism in this way.
derek ball Property Identities and Modal Arguments
Kripke (1980, pp. 144-155) famously argued that “pain” and “c-fiber fir-
ing” are rigid designators and that identity statements involving rigid
designators are necessary if true. He also argued that it is metaphys-
ically possible that pain occur without c-fiber firing, and c-fiber firing
without pain. Kripke thus tentatively endorsed the following sort of
modal argument:2
1. If pain = c-fiber firing, then necessarily pain = c-fiber firing. (From
the rigidity of “pain” and “c-fiber firing”.)
2. It is not the case that necessarily pain = c-fiber firing. (Because there
might be disembodied spirits that have pain without c-fiber firing,
and there might be zombies that have c-fiber firing without pain.)
3. Therefore, it is not the case that pain = c-fiber firing.
If the modal argument stands, the physicalist is refuted. Sev-
eral large literatures focus on the putative grounds for premise (2):
whether conceivability entails possibility (e.g., Balog (1999), Chalmers
(2002)), the evidential status of ‘intuition’ (e.g., Bealer (2000)), whether
the seeming coherence of the zombie hypothesis survives reflective
scrutiny (e.g., Shoemaker (2003b), Tye (2006)), and so forth. The results
seem inconclusive. But the physicalist has resources that have gone
largely unappreciated. Premise (1), and the claim that the argument is
valid, depend on controversial Kripkean views about the metaphysics
of modality and the semantics of modal expressions. The physicalist
can grant premise (2) and the modal epistemology from which it flows
if she rejects the Kripkean metaphysics and semantics. This paper pur-
sues one version of this strategy by examining the resources needed to
resist the modal argument from a counterpart-theoretic perspective. In
particular, I argue that the physicalist can defend her view by adopting
2. This style of argument is sometimes known as the conceivability argument,
since the second premise can be motivated by claims about the conceivabil-
ity of zombies or disembodied spirits.
counterpart theory for properties. The physicalist therefore has a pow-
erful reason to be a counterpart theorist, and to extend her counterpart
theory to modal claims involving properties.3
2. Lewis vs. the Modal Argument
It should not be surprising that a paper dealing with issues in counter-
part theory should have roots in the work of David Lewis. And Lewis
did respond to modal arguments by questioning Kripkean metaphys-
ical and semantic views. But Kripke advanced three modal arguments:
one targets type identity claims such as the claim that pain = c-fiber fir-
ing, another token identity claims such as the claim that this very pain
= this very brain state, while the third targets the claim that persons
are identical to their bodies. And Lewis developed two very different
responses to modal arguments: he defended the type identity claim
by denying that “pain” is a rigid designator, but he defended person-
body identity by appealing to the flexibility of the counterpart relation.
Let me begin by considering his response to the argument against type
identity.
2.1 The Rigidity of “Pain”
In “Mad Pain and Martian Pain” (Lewis 1983c) and in “Reduction of
Mind” (Lewis 1999c), Lewis maintained that “pain” is not a rigid des-
ignator. If this is correct, then the claim that pain = c-fiber firing is
contingent: there are worlds in which “pain” and “c-fiber firing” des-
ignate distinct phenomena. Thus on this view the first premise of the
modal argument (as presented above) is false.
3. Having said that I am considering issues in modal metaphysics, I hereby
explicitly set aside the question of the nature of possible worlds. In partic-
ular, I will presuppose neither the truth nor the falsity of Lewis’s extreme
modal realism. For non-Lewisian account of possible worlds that is friendly
to counterpart theory, see Sider (2002).
philosophers’ imprint - 2 - vol. 11, no. 13 (november 2011)
derek ball Property Identities and Modal Arguments
But the claim that “pain” is non-rigid is not sufficient to answer
every form of the modal argument. There are at least three further
physicalist commitments that remain vulnerable. First, there are token
identity statements: the physicalist claims not only that pain as a type
= c-fiber firing, but also that this very pain = this very brain state.
And Kripke explicitly advanced modal arguments targeting this sort
of claim. But the idea that “this very pain” is non-rigid is implausible:
demonstratives are generally held to be the best case for direct ref-
erence.4 Second, physicalism is committed to de re modal claims: for
example, the claim of this very pain and this very brain state that nec-
essarily, they are identical, and the claim of pain and c-fiber firing that
they are identical. Here, rigidity is irrelevant, since we are quantifying
in to the scope of “necessarily”.
Third, the physicalist is committed to identities among properties
designated as such. For example, the physicalist must maintain that
the property of being in pain = the property of having firing c-fibers.
But it would be strange for Lewis to claim that “the property of being
in pain” is non-rigid. Typically, phrases of the form pthe property of
being φq are rigid, even if φ itself is not. For example, “the inventor
of bifocals” is non-rigid: it picks out Benjamin Franklin in the actual
world, but other inventors in other worlds. Nonetheless, “the property
of being the inventor of bifocals” seems to pick out the same property
in every world: the property that Franklin actually has, and others
might have had.
The claim that property designators like “the property of being in
pain” and “the property of being the inventor of bifocals” are rigid
can be bolstered by a further argument.5 Consider the property of be-
ing the first Postmaster General of the United States. This property is
actually instantiated by (and only by) Benjamin Franklin. Franklin is
also the only individual who actually instantiates the property of being
4. Some have held that complex demonstratives are disguised quantifier ex-
pressions; but the argument could be reformulated using simple “this” and
“that”.
5. For more arguments to this conclusion, see Schnieder (2005).
the inventor of bifocals. So the two properties are actually instantiated
by and only by exactly the same individual. Nonetheless, it is gener-
ally agreed (in particular, by Lewis) that they are distinct properties.6
How do we know that they are distinct? Well, Franklin is both the first
Postmaster General and the inventor of bifocals, but he might not have
been. It could have been that Franklin instantiates the property of be-
ing the first Postmaster General, while someone else – say, Saul Kripke
– instantiates the property of being the inventor of bifocals. That is,
there is a world w in which Franklin alone instantiates the property of
being the first Postmaster General, and Kripke alone instantiates the
property of being the inventor of bifocals. So the property of being the
inventor of bifocals is such that it is instantiated in w by Kripke, and
the property of being the first Postmaster General is not. So the two
properties must be distinct.
This line of argument would fail if “the property of being the first
Postmaster General” or “the property of being the inventor of bifocals”
were not rigid. For suppose that “the property of being the inventor
of bifocals” were not rigid. In that case, the property instantiated by
Kripke in w need not be the property actually instantiated by Franklin.
Call the property instantiated by Kripke in w ‘P1’. The fact that Kripke
(but not Franklin) instantiates P1 at w is no more relevant to the iden-
tity in the actual world of the property of being the first Postmaster
General and the property of being the inventor of bifocals than the fact
that Kripke is the inventor of bifocals at w1 is relevant to the identity
in the actual world of the first Postmaster General and the inventor of
bifocals. So if “the property of being the inventor of bifocals” or “the
property of being the first Postmaster General” is non-rigid, the argu-
ment in the previous paragraph fails. But the standard view has it that
we know that these two properties are distinct, and that the facts about
worlds like w are decisive evidence for their distinctness. So given the
standard view, “the property of being the first Postmaster General”
6. I question this general agreement in section 3.1.1 below.
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must be a rigid designator. Moreover, these considerations generalize
to all designators of the form pthe property of being φq.
Thus even if “pain” is non-rigid, as Lewis claims, “the property of
being in pain” is not. Thus modal arguments could be used to target
the claim that the property of being in pain = the property of having
firing c-fibers. So even if Lewis can avoid a dualism of states, he would
need some other resource to avoid a dualism of properties.7
2.2 Counterparts of Persons
Thus Lewis’s first response to the modal argument cannot be counted a
complete success. What of his response to the argument against mind-
body identity? Here, Lewis appealed to counterpart theory. His view
is that individuals are world-bound; each person and each body exists
in only one possible world. De re modal claims are made true by coun-
terparts of the res in question: “To say that something here in our actual
world is such that it might have done so-and-so is not to say that there
is a world in which that thing itself does so-and-so, but that there is
a world in which a counterpart of that thing does so-and-so” (Lewis
1983b, p. 49).
Counterpart relations are relations of similarity. But there are many
respects in which things can be similar. There are therefore many pos-
sible counterpart relations. Which counterpart relation is selected in a
context is determined by contextual features of the conversation. Two
such features will be relevant to our discussion. The first is the words
used; certain words tend to make salient particular aspects of similar-
ity, and thus particular counterpart relations (Lewis 1983b, pp. 51-52).
The second relevant mechanism for selecting counterpart relations is
accommodation: we tend to select counterpart relations that make our
claims true:
7. I owe this line of argument (though not the detailed considerations of the
previous two paragraphs) to George Bealer.
I suggest that those philosophers who preach that origins are es-
sential are absolutely right – in the context of their own preach-
ing. They make themselves right: their preaching constitutes a
context in which de re modality is governed by a way of repre-
senting (as I think, by a counterpart relation) that requires match
of origins. But if I ask how things would be if Saul Kripke had
come from no sperm and egg but had been brought by a stork,
that makes equally good sense. I create a context that makes my
question make sense, and to do so it has to be a context that
makes origins not be essential. (Lewis 1986a, p. 252)
How does this bear on the modal argument?8
1. If I = my body, then necessarily I = my body. (From the rigidity of
“I” and “my body”.)
2. It is not the case that necessarily I = my body (because I could have
been a disembodied spirit, or inhabited a different body).
3. Therefore, it is not the case that I = my body.
A first point is that in Lewis’s system, it is not straightforward to es-
tablish (1) by appeal to rigidity. In Kripke’s terminology, a rigid desig-
nator picks out the same object at all possible worlds. But this notion
of rigidity is of little use in Lewis’s system, since according to Lewis,
ordinary individuals exist only at a single possible world.9
8. Unless I say otherwise, I am throughout setting aside the possibility that
a thing has more than one counterpart at a world (e.g., that I might have
been twins.)
9. Lewis suggests an analog of rigidity: a term is quasi-rigid under a counter-
part relation R if and only if at each world it picks out the counterparts
according to R of its actual referent (if any such counterparts exist) (Lewis
1986a, p. 256). Using this terminology, the view to be described in this
section is that, although some uses of “I” and “my body” are quasi-rigid
under a common counterpart relation, other (perhaps more typical) uses of
“I” and “my body” are quasi-rigid only under different counterpart rela-
tions. Given the former sort of use, premise (1) is true but premise (2) is
false; given the latter sort of use, premise (2) is true but premise (1) is false.
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What matters to the truth of claims like (1) on Lewis’s view is
whether the identity of myself and my body ensures that all of my
counterparts (that is, counterparts of me qua person) are also counter-
parts of my body (that is, counterparts of me qua body). But Lewis
argues that different counterpart relations can be active in different
contexts, and in particular that some terms tend to make a particular
counterpart relation active.
This has the result that two names for the same thing can tend
to be evaluated with respect to two different counterpart relations. For
example, the term “my body” will tend to make salient counterpart re-
lations that emphasize bodily respects of similarity, such as size, shape,
and color. But a term like “I” tends to make salient counterpart rela-
tions that emphasize personal respects of similarity, such as personal-
ity, intellect, and social role. It is no surprise that something could be
like me in bodily respects while being unlike me in personal respects,
and vice-versa. So it is not surprising that some counterparts of me
with respect to the bodily counterpart relation are not counterparts of
me with respect to the personal counterpart relation. But according to
Lewis, in the appropriate context (2) just asserts that there are personal
counterparts of me that are not bodily counterparts of me.
In a context where two counterpart relations (one preferred by use
of “I”, the other by “my body”), (2) is true. But this is not to say that
there are no contexts in which a premise like (1) would be true. Perhaps
we can generate one if we read aloud relevant passages from Naming
and Necessity. If our Kripkean claims about the necessity of identity
go unchallenged, a context is established in which there is only one
counterpart relation relevant to evaluating claims about me. And in
such a context, (1) is true: every counterpart of me (with respect to the
only counterpart relation we are paying attention to) is a counterpart
of me.
But in this context, (2) is false. When we argue so as to make (2)
plausible, we shift the context by making two distinct counterpart re-
lations salient. For example, we might ask how it would be if I had
no body at all, but were a spirit in the ether. Just as we accommodate
Lewis’s question about Kripke and the stork, we accommodate this
question: we create a context in which the question makes sense. In
this case, it must be a context in which some counterparts of me (qua
person) are not counterparts of my body (qua body).
Thus Lewis can deny that the argument is sound: contexts in which
the first premise is true are contexts in which the second premise is
false, and vice-versa. The argument’s plausibility is also explained:
each premise is appealing when it is defended, because its defense
makes it express something true. But when we hear each premise as
true, we have illicitly shifted the context and the argument is invalid.
Slightly more formally, the situation is this. The following counter-
part theoretic translation of the modal argument is valid:
1. (DB = DB’s body)→ ∀w∀x∀y((w is a world & x is in w & y is in w &
x bears counterpart relation C to DB & y bears counterpart relation
C to DB’s body) → x = y)
2. ∃w∃x∃y((w is a world & x is in w & y is in w & x bears counterpart
relation C to DB & y bears counterpart relation C to DB’s body
& x 6 6= y)
3. Therefore, DB 6 6= DB’s body.
Only one counterpart relation plays a role in this translation. Lewis’s
objection is that the proponent of the argument is not entitled to (2),
since her defense of (2) will make other counterpart relations active.
So such a defense will only establish something like (2′):
2′ ∃w∃x∃y((w is a world & x is in w & y is in w & x bears counterpart
relation C′ to DB & y bears counterpart relation C′′ to DB’s body
& x 6 6= y)
But no argument from (1) and (2′) validly leads to (3).
3. Counterparts and Properties
Lewis’s first response to the modal argument failed. Can his counter-
part theoretic response be extended to defend physicalist type identity
claims?
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There is a prima facie reason to think that it does not. Pain is a
type of state; that is to say, a property of states.10 But Lewis held that
properties (unlike, say, you and me) are trans-world individuals: prop-
erties are literally identical across worlds.11 One might think that this
means that there is no need for counterpart theory to handle modal
claims about properties. In fact, I doubt this is so (and we will return
to this point); but for the moment, let it stand. Even if the counterpart-
theoretic machinery does not apply straightforwardly to claims about
properties, the mechanisms Lewis appeals to predict failures of some
modal arguments targeting property identities, since some names of
properties include names of individuals.
Lewis maintains that properties are classes of actual and possible
individuals. He claims that properties are the semantic values of ab-
stract singular terms like “red”, “humility”, and “being a student”.
Moreover, he claims that for “any predicate phrase whatever, however
complicated”, there is a property that corresponds to it (Lewis 1999a,
p. 18). In particular, Lewis endorses the following Property Compre-
hension Principle:
PCP For any predicate φ, there is a unique property P (the property
of being φ) which is such that necessarily, for all x, x has P iff φx
(Lewis 1999a, p. 18).
Now consider the predicate “is a student of Quine”. The PCP entails
(2):
10. Some metaphysicians might hold that types are not properties. The discus-
sion to follow should be adaptable to such a view.
11. An anonymous referee points out that the term “trans-world individual” is
often used to describe individuals that are a shared part of more than one
world. Of course this is not the sense in which properties are trans-world
on Lewis’s view. Properties are not a part of any world; instead, they are
instantiated in more than world. Likewise, when I later speak of “world-
bound” properties, this is not meant to suggest that properties are parts
of a single world, but that any given property is instantiated only in one
world.
(2) There is a unique property P (the property of being a student of
Quine) which is such that necessarily, for all x, x has P iff x is a
student of Quine.
(2) contains a modal operator. On Lewis’s view, such operators are to
be analyzed counterpart-theoretically. We are assuming for the sake of
argument that we do not need the machinery of counterpart theory to
handle claims about properties, so the left-hand side of our embedded
biconditional will be unaffected. But the right-hand side contains the
proper name “Quine”, and this will have to be ‘translated’ counterpart-
theoretically. The result will be something like the following:
(3) There is a unique property P (the property of being a student of
Quine), which is such that for any world w and individual x in w,
(x has P iff there is a y such that y is in w and y is a counterpart of
Quine and x is a student of y).
So far, so good. But as we noted earlier, there are a multiplicity of
counterpart relations. In a Kripkean context, Quine-counterparts have
to have come from (counterparts of) the very sperm and egg from
which Quine actually arose. In more liberal contexts, some worlds in
which (counterparts of) Mama and Papa Quine are blessed by the leav-
ings of a stork might count as containing Quine counterparts. So in
some contexts it is true to say “It might have been that all sentient be-
ings are brought by storks, and Quine exists,” (where the modal takes
scope over both conjuncts). In other contexts, we could not truly so
speak.
So the counterpart relation that plays a role in (3) can vary from
context to context. This means that the set of actual and possible indi-
viduals who can truly be said to “have the property of being a student
of Quine” will vary from context to context. For example, in a Krip-
kean context no one who is the student of a being brought by a stork
will count; in a more liberal context, it might be true to say of a stu-
dent whose Quinish teacher was stork-brought, “She has the property
of being a student of Quine”.
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This mechanism already generates a phenomenon much like that
Lewis described in “Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies”. For
example, suppose that “Van” is another name for Quine, but suppose
that in some contexts “Van” and “Quine” make salient different coun-
terpart relations, CV and CQ. Applying the PCP in each case:
(4) There is a unique property P (the property of being a student of
Quine), which is such that for any world w and individual x in w,
(x has P iff there is a y such that y is in w and y bears CQ to Quine
and x is a student of y).
(5) There is a unique property Q (the property of being a student of
Van), which is such that for any world w and individual x in w, (x
has Q iff there is a y such that y is in w and y bears CV to Quine
and x is a student of y).
Now some possible beings will bear CV but not CQ to Quine, and
vice-versa. So in the context where “Quine” and “Van” make salient
different counterpart relations, it will be true to say of some possible
beings, “She has the property of being a student of Van”, but false to
say, “She has the property of being a student of Quine.” But, given
Lewis’s view of properties, this is sufficient to make it true to say, “The
property of being a student of Van is not identical to the property of
being a student of Quine.”
Suppose, on the other hand, that we are in a Kripkean context in
which only one counterpart relation (C) is salient. Then the PCP will
deliver:
(6) There is a unique property P (the property of being a student of
Quine), which is such that for any world w and individual x in w,
(x has P iff there is a y such that y is in w and y bears C to Quine
and x is a student of y).
(7) There is a unique property Q (the property of being a student of
Van), which is such that for any world w and individual x in w, (x
has Q iff there is a y such that y is in w and y bears C to Quine and
x is a student of y).
In this case, there is no possible being of whom it is true to say, “She
has the property of being a student of Quine,” but false to say, “She
has the property of being a student of Van,” and vice-versa. Given that
properties are individuated by their actual and possible extensions,
this entails that in such a context it is true to say, “The property of
being a student of Quine is identical to the property of being a student
of Van.”
Now suppose an ‘identity theorist’ utters (8):
(8) The property of being a student of Quine is identical to the
property of being a student of Van.
Such an utterance might express a truth. But a ‘property dualist’ might
reply with (9):
(9) The property of being a student of Quine is not identical to the
property of being a student of Van.
And this, too, might express a truth, if the dualist succeeds in making
two counterpart relations salient. (8) and (9), as uttered in the contexts
described, are not in conflict. The phenomenon is exactly that which
Lewis described in the modal argument against person-body identity.
Given the PCP, it can be generated without explicit modal operators,
since the counterfactual extensions of “property” phrases are deter-
mined in part by counterpart relations.
Thus the context-sensitivity of sentences attributing the property
identities is predicted in certain cases by mechanisms the counter-
part theorist already accepts. But how can this strategy be applied to
the modal argument against physicalism in philosophy of mind? It is
rather unclear that it can. We are assuming that “pain” and “c-fiber
firing” pick out properties of states. The claim would have to be that
at least one of these terms is context sensitive: it picks out different
properties in different contexts. It is not clear what could motivate this
view. Moreover, even if the view could somehow be defended, there
would be contexts in which “the property of being in pain” picks out
a different property than “the property of having firing c-fibers”. This
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threatens to vindicate the property dualist.12
3.1 World-bound Properties
The strategy of the previous section works when it does because some
terms that denote properties are built up out of ordinary names, to
which counterpart theory applies. It does not translate neatly to simple
terms that pick out properties, such as “pain”. How are we to handle
modal claims involving such terms?
A first thought might be that since properties are trans-world in-
dividuals (or so, following Lewis, we have granted so far), we do not
need to treat modal claims about properties counterpart-theoretically.
But this thought is rendered problematic by the disuniform, arguably
non-compositional treatment of modal claims that it would require. It
would be inelegant and methodologically undesirable to give entirely
different semantics for modal claims involving properties and those
involving other individuals.
We need counterparts of properties.13 But the opponent of the
modal argument is not home yet. If properties are genuine trans-
world individuals, then identity will always be a salient candidate for
the counterpart relation. So the proponent of the modal argument for
property dualism might claim that identity is the only eligible counter-
part relation for properties. If this were correct, Lewis’s context-shifting
12. There may be a glimmer of hope. If the physicalist could argue that (1)
“pain” and “c-fiber firing” are context sensitive in the indicated way, and (2)
in the contexts in which “pain” and “c-fiber firing” pick out distinct proper-
ties, at least one of these properties is highly non-natural, then physicalism
might be saved. (For discussion of why this is physicalistically acceptable,
see fn. 30 below.) But I do not know how these claims might be defended.
13. Others have defended counterpart theory for properties. Mark Heller (1998)
argues that some of the problems Lewis raises for ersatzist alternatives to
his modal realism can be avoided by a theorist who endorses property
counterparts. Cian Dorr (2005) motivates counterparts of propositions on
semantic grounds; his arguments extend to properties. Ghislain Guigon
(2009, pp. 213-218) defends counterpart of properties as a way of accom-
modating our judgments that co-extensive properties can be distinct. But
none of these authors develops the practical applications and consequences
of the view in the way I pursue in this paper.
solution to the modal argument could not get off the ground, since the
same counterpart relation would be active in every context.
Lewis called the view that there is only a single counterpart rela-
tion constancy (Lewis 1986a, §4.5). If constancy obtains, then Lewis’s
response to the modal argument fails. This section and the next ex-
amine two ways of denying constancy. The first holds that properties
are world bound; thus identity is not a candidate for the counterpart
relation, and the argument discussed in the previous paragraph fails.
The second holds that properties are not world bound, but denies that
the counterpart relation is always identity.
3.1.1 Arguments for World-bound Properties
Consider the claim that properties are world-bound: redness, for ex-
ample, exists only at this world, and is represented by counterparts at
other worlds. The view should have some appeal for the class nomi-
nalist, since a traditional objection to class nominalism is that it must
treat distinct properties (e.g. Quine’s being a cordate and being a renate)
as identical, since they are instantiated by exactly the same actual in-
dividuals. Lewis can avoid this consequence by appealing to classes of
possibilia, but it is not clear that all opponents of his extreme modal
realism have this option. But by allowing a counterpart relation among
properties, the class nominalist can note that although being a cordate
and being a renate are actually identical, they might not have been. For
many purposes, this will do as well as the claim that they are actually
distinct (Guigon 2009, pp. 213-218).14
The situation is perhaps a bit more complicated with more realist
accounts of properties. But in every case, properties are creatures of
theory: they are postulated to fill a theoretical role. (“To deserve the
14. World-bound properties will not serve every purpose to which philoso-
phers have put properties. For example, they would not do as the objects of
attitudes a la Lewis’s account of attitudes de se (Lewis 1983a). But any ap-
pearance of conflict is merely terminological. We can admit sets of possible
individuals (Lewisian properties), and maintain that these are the objects
of attitudes, while denying that they are properties in the sense relevant to
the dispute between physicalists and dualists.
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name of ‘property’ is to be suited to play the right theoretical role”
(Lewis 1986a, p. 55).) It may be that world-bound individuals are best
suited to play this role.
Why think that properties might be world bound? Lewis’s main
argument against trans-world individuals is the problem of accidental
intrinsics. Suppose (what is plausible) that being two meters tall is an
intrinsic property. I am two meters tall, but I might not have been. For
the proponent of trans-world identity, this means that there is some
world in which I am not two meters tall (that is, there is some world
that strictly and literally has non-two-meter me (not merely a coun-
terpart of me) as a part); I am two meters tall, but someone identical
to me is not two meters tall. But this is a contradiction: I am and am
not two meters tall. So either the property of being two meters tall is
not intrinsic (and in general there are no accidental intrinsics), which
is implausible, or individuals are world-bound.
Egan (2004) points out that a similar problem occurs for accidental
higher-order predications. The property of being red is instantiated,
but it might not have been. So there is some world at which the prop-
erty of being red is not instantiated; it is instantiated, but something
identical to it is not instantiated. But this is a contradiction: it is and is
not instantiated.
One way to avoid this problem would be to claim that the property
of being instantiated is in fact a relation (for example, a relation to
worlds). Egan suggests that this strategy fails, since such a relation
would not be had contingently: the property of being instantiated in w
is a property that is had at all worlds if at all.
What alternatives remain?15 One attractive possibility is to take or-
dinary individuals as a model. On this view, properties are world-
bound entities, whose modal features are given by counterpart the-
15. Considerations of space prevent me from discussing the full variety of pos-
sible responses to Egan’s argument (and the Lewisian arguments that fol-
low). In any case, I need not endorse the arguments wholeheartedly. My
point is conditional: if you like the arguments as applied to individuals,
you should like them as applied to properties.
ory.16 There are further reasons to find the view attractive. Lewis ar-
gues that counterpart theory is superior to trans-world identity be-
cause the counterpart relation need not be an equivalence relation. This
helps the counterpart theorist solve puzzles that might be problematic
for the identity theorist. But these puzzles also arise with respect to
properties. For example:
First puzzle: Unlike identity, counterpart relations need not be 1-1.
Lewis claims this as an advantage of his view because he could have
been twins. But properties, too, could have ‘been twins’. For example,
there might have been two properties of being positively charged. We
can imagine a world in which there are two distinct sets of entities,
each of which bears suitable relations to negatively charged entities;
but when members from each of the two sets come into contact, they
react violently. It would be arbitrary to pick one as being the property
of being positively charged in that world; both have equally good claim
to the title.17 If properties are linked across worlds by identity, we have
a problem: two distinct properties cannot be identical to one actual
property. But if properties are linked by counterpart relations, all is
well: two distinct properties can perfectly well be counterparts of a
single property.
Second puzzle: Unlike identity, the counterpart relation is not tran-
sitive. Lewis sees this as an advantage of his view because it lets him
avoid ‘Chisholm’s paradox’ (Chisholm 1979) and related arguments
(Lewis 1986a, pp. 245-6). Here is one version of the paradox: consider
two ships, s1 and s2, in world w1. s1 and s2 are made from distinct sets
16. Should we say the same about relations? There is some reason to think that
certain relations must relate individuals at different worlds: the counterpart
relation is a case in point. I doubt that this is much more than a terminolog-
ical question; many views (such as the class nominalism discussed above)
can admit both the world-bound and trans-world entities. The substantive
question (for the purposes of evaluating physicalism) is: into which camp
does pain fall?
17. It might be objected in a Kripkean vein that it is up to us to stipulate which
is the property of being positively charged. In that case, I stipulate that both
are.
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of planks. With Kripke, we want to say that s1 could not have been
made from a completely distinct set of planks (say, the set that s2 is
made from); but surely it is possible for s1 to have been built from a
set containing one different plank. Imagine a world w2 in which this is
so. But from the point of view of w2, it is again possible that s1 have
been built from a set containing one different plank. And by consid-
ering a series of such worlds, we get to a world in which s1 is built
from the set of planks that s2 is built from in w1. So our Kripkean
essentialism is false.
Lewis wants (in some contexts) to be able to accept essentialism.
He blocks the argument by denying the transitivity of the counterpart
relation. s1 has a counterpart in w2, the counterpart has a counterpart
in w3, but it does not follow that s1 has a counterpart in w3. So the fact
that s1 could have been slightly different, and the fact that its counter-
parts (and its counterparts’ counterparts, etc.) could have been slightly
different, do not entail that anything and everything is possible for s1.
Similar scenarios can be devised with respect to properties. For ex-
ample, suppose that a certain property p conveys in w1 a certain set of
causal powers. Given different natural laws, this property could have
conveyed slightly different causal powers.18 So consider a world w2 in
which this is so. From the point of view of w2, it is again possible that p
could have conveyed a slightly different set of causal powers. But now
we are off to the races: this line of reasoning would entail that p could
have conveyed any powers at all. As before, we can block the argument
18. Some (e.g. Shoemaker (2003a)) have denied this on the grounds that prop-
erties are individuated by their causal powers and so have their causal
powers essentially. This view would defeat the present argument. But there
is a good reason for proponents of Shoemaker’s view to accept property
counterparts. A defender of property counterparts could admit much of
Shoemaker’s view, while avoiding its most problematic consequence: the
metaphysical necessity of natural laws. For example, a defender of property
counterparts could claim that everywhere, in every world, the property of
being copper conveys the property of conducting electricity. It would not
follow that necessarily, copper conducts electricity, since some counterparts
of the property of being copper might convey different causal powers.
by holding that properties are world-bound, and that the counterpart
relation that links them is not transitive.19
3.1.2 Constancy
So there are some attractions to the view that for some purposes prop-
erties are best treated as world-bound. How does this affect the modal
argument? The key issue is constancy. The counterpart-theoretic re-
sponse to the modal argument can succeed only if different counter-
part relations can be made active in different contexts. But we can
mimic Lewis’s case against constancy in the case of counterparts of in-
dividuals for properties. Lewis’s argument is as follows (Lewis 1986a,
p 249). The Great Western Railroad could have absorbed another rail-
road as a part, but it actually did not.
Let GWR- be the Great Western as it actually was without the
missing line. Let GWR be the Great Western. Let GWR+ be the
sum of GWR- and the missing line. Here is GWR, in other words
GWR-; they are identical. But the plural is a nonsense of gram-
mar; ‘they’ are one thing, and it is self-identical. What might
have happened to it? It is GWR; so it would have been greater,
19. An anonymous referee notes that there is alternative account of Chisholm’s
paradox, if we assume that there are coincident objects that have their
modal properties essentially. For suppose that in the vicinity of ship s1 there
are s′1, composed of planks p1, p2, and p3, but possibly composed of p2, p3,
and p4; s′2, composed of p1, p2, and p3, but possibly composed of p1, p3,
and p5, and so forth. And suppose that “s1” is indeterminate in reference,
so that any of the s′ns are acceptable precisifications of “s1”. Given a plausi-
ble story about accommodation, any utterance of (e.g.) “s1 could have been
made from planks p2, p3, and p4” will express a truth, but given that no
acceptable precisification of “s1” could have been made from the planks s2
is actually made from, no utterance of “s1 could have been made from the
planks s2 actually is” will express a truth. Now Lewis rejects coincidence
views for ordinary objects like ships (1986a, pp. 252-253). But an analogous
view about properties might seem less objectionable. In fact, however, I
think that such a view is problematic. How could there be properties that
actually convey exactly the same causal powers but possibly convey differ-
ent powers? What could ground these putative modal differences? Even if
some grounding is found, the view would have strange consequences as
regards causation. Which property would be causally efficacious in a given
case? Is all causation massively overdetermined?
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in fact it would have been identical to GWR+. It is GWR-; so it
would have been only a part of GWR, not the whole, and hence
not identical to GWR, which would instead have been identical
to GWR+. Most certainly it, that is GWR-, would not have been
identical to GWR+. We contradict ourselves about what would
have become of this one thing which we can refer to in two ways:
as GWR or as GWR-. (Lewis 1986a, p 249)
What Lewis describes is the material for a modal argument to the
effect that GWR is not identical to GWR-. In combination with the (as
Lewis thinks) evident fact that the two are in fact identical, we have a
contradiction. One possible response to the argument would be to hold
that “GWR” is not a rigid designator. After all, in the actual world
GWR = GWR-. But it might have been the case that GWR = GWR+.
An intuitive test for rigidity is as follows: N is rigid iff pN might
not have been Nq, or pN might not have been what it in fact isq ex-
press truths (e.g. Kripke 1980, p. 48). Since GWR- could not have been
GWR+, that is just to say that “GWR” designates different things in
different worlds: GWR- here, GWR+ elsewhere. In other words, GWR
might not have been what it in fact is (because GWR = GWR-, but
might not have been); GWR might not have been GWR.
But Lewis rejects this maneuver. He argues that the puzzle can be
regenerated in a way that blocks the solution. If no counterpart rela-
tion is particularly salient (or if two are equally salient), then we don’t
know what to say about the modal features of GWR/GWR-: “I ask
you: think of this object we’ve been talking about under two names –
now, what would have happened to it if the line had been absorbed?
Now you’re stuck [...] you have no unequivocally right answer” (Lewis
1986a, p. 250). The non-rigidity theorist claimed that the vacillation as
to whether GWR/GWR- could have included the missing line is a re-
sult of the fact that “GWR” designates different objects in different
worlds. But the same vacillation can be generated without using the
term “GWR”, and the non-rigidity theorist seems to have no account
of this phenomenon.
The solution Lewis advocates is the same as in “Counterparts of
Persons and their Bodies”. Consider GWR/GWR-. Relative to the
counterpart relation made salient by “GWR”, it could have been iden-
tical to the GWR+. Relative to the counterpart relation made salient by
“GWR-”, it could not have been. So in the “GWR” context, an utter-
ance of “It could have been the GWR+” is true; in the “GWR-” context
an utterance of the same sentence is false. There is no contradiction,
because the two utterances express different propositions because of
the different counterpart relations involved.
I said that we could mimic Lewis’s argument for the case of prop-
erties. Indeed, I think that the argument has in effect been mimicked
in the dispute between Lewis and Kripke over the rigidity of “pain”.
Kripke famously argued that “pain” is rigid: “if something is a pain
it is essentially so, and it seems absurd to suppose that pain could
have been some phenomenon other than the one it is” (Kripke 1980, p.
148-9).
Lewis replied as follows:
Think of some occasion when you were in severe pain, unmis-
takable and unignorable. All will agree, except for some philoso-
phers and faith healers, that there is a state that actually occu-
pies the pain role (or near enough); that it is called ‘pain’; and
that you were in it on that occasion. For now, I assume noth-
ing about the nature of this state, or about how it deserves its
name. Now consider an unactualized situation in which some
different state occupies the pain role in place of the actual occu-
pant; and in which you were in that different state; and which
is otherwise as much like the actual situation as possible. Can
you distinguish the actual situation from this unactualized alter-
native? I say not, or not without laborious investigation. But if
‘pain’ is a rigid designator, then the alternative situation is one
in which you were not in pain, so you could distinguish the two
very easily. So ‘pain’ is not a rigid designator. (1999c, p. 304)
I take the argument here to be as follows: suppose that actually,
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pain = c-fiber firing. It is possible that something other than c-fiber
firing (say, d-fiber firing) plays the role of pain (including causing all
of the beliefs, reactions, desires, etc., that pain actually causes.) Lewis
claims that a world where d-fiber firing plays the pain role (and c-fiber
firing does not) is indistinguishable from the actual world, except by
empirical investigation. But a world in which you are not in pain is
easily distinguishable from a world in which you are in pain. So it
must be that a world in which d-fibers play the pain role is a world in
which d-fiber firing = pain (and hence c-fiber firing 6 6= pain).
This line of thought bears obvious similarities to a defense of the
second premise of the modal argument against the claim that pain =
c-fiber firing. Lewis rebuts it by arguing that “pain” is not a rigid des-
ignator: “pain” designates c-fiber firing here, and d-fiber firing else-
where. In other words, pain might not have been what it in fact is (i.e,
it might have been d-fiber firing, even though it is in fact c-fiber firing);
pain might not have been pain. So “pain” is not a rigid designator.
At this point it should be clear that there is another alternative: the
denial of constancy. And Lewis’s argument against the non-rigidity
solution in the case of “GWR” generalizes to this case as well. Suppose
that pain = c-fiber firing, and think of that phenomenon, which we have
been referring to by two names – now, what would have happened to
it if d-fibers had played the pain role? If we have followed Lewis this
far, we should be unsure what to say. But these are the grounds on
which Lewis denied constancy in the case of “GWR” and “GWR-”. If
that argument succeeds, we should also deny constancy for “pain” and
“c-fiber firing”.20
So we now have the materials to resist the modal argument against
physicalism. To recap: de re modal claims, including those about prop-
20. Note that we need not deny constancy in every case. For example, an
anonymous referee suggests that there may be no need for the flexibility of
counterpart theory for fundamental physical properties like force or spin. If
that is correct, it will be represented in our system by there being only one
admissible counterpart relation associated with the word “force”. (In the
system of the next section, according to which properties are trans-world
individuals, this counterpart relation might be identity.)
erties, are true in virtue of the counterparts of the res in question. If
properties are world-bound, then the counterpart relation is not iden-
tity. But then there is no reason to assume that modal claims about a
given property are always evaluated with respect to the same coun-
terpart relation. In particular, different names for the same thing can
make different counterpart relations salient. So what makes a claim
like “possibly, pain 6 6= c-fiber firing” true (in the contexts where it is)
is the fact that pain/c-fiber firing has counterparts according to one
counterpart relation that are not its counterparts according to another
relation. But this tells not at all against the claim that pain = c-fiber
firing, and not at all against the claim that according to any single
counterpart relation, “necessarily, pain = c-fiber firing” is true.
3.2 Trans-world Properties
In the last section, we assumed that properties are world-bound, and
combined this with the denial of constancy for the counterpart re-
lation that binds properties at different worlds. But it is possible to
uphold the traditional view that properties exist at multiple worlds
while dropping the assumption of constancy. On this view, properties
are trans-world individuals. But modal claims about a given property
need not be evaluated by examining that very property at other worlds;
instead, they are evaluated by looking at counterparts of that property
(which may, but need not, be the property itself).
Let me explain further. Recall that for the counterpart theorist, or-
dinary individuals are world-bound. They are in one world only; thus
their modal properties cannot be a result of what happens to them
in other worlds – nothing happens to them in other worlds. Instead,
what we look to is what happens to them according to other worlds;
how other worlds represent them as being. And what happens to me
according to another world is what happens to my counterparts in it.
That is to say, it is not in virtue of worlds alone that modal claims
about me are true; rather, it is in virtue of worlds in combination with
counterpart relations.
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On the view we are now considering, properties exist in multiple
worlds. But this does not significantly change the situation as regards
the nature of modal truth. Again, modal claims about a particular
property need not be true in virtue of what happens to that property
in other worlds, but rather in virtue of what happens to it according to
other worlds – how they represent it as being. It is still not in virtue of
worlds alone that modal claims about properties are true, but in virtue
of worlds in combination with counterpart relations. And the relevant
counterpart relation need not be identity.
How would this model affect the modal argument against physical-
ism? We are conceiving of properties as trans-world individuals, so if
pain = c-fiber firing, then everything in every world that is in pain has
firing c-fibers, and vice-versa. But this fact is not relevant (or at least
not decisive) to the truth of “necessarily, pain = c-fiber firing”. That
claim is true only if all of the counterparts of pain (designated as such)
are counterparts of c-fiber firing (designated as such).
We can generate contexts in which this is so; for example, perhaps
in some contexts, the only salient counterpart relation just is identity. In
such contexts, the first premise of our original modal argument would
be true. The situation changes when the second premise is defended.
The defender of the second premise makes active a two counterpart
relations. So she succeeds in generating a context in which “possibly,
pain 6 6= c-fiber firing” is true. But this does not entail that pain 6 6= c-fiber
firing; it only entails that pain/c-fiber firing has different counterparts
according to different counterpart relations. The worlds that make an
utterance of “possibly, pain 6 6= c-fiber firing” true are not worlds in
which pain 6 6= c-fiber firing, since there are no such worlds; instead they
are worlds according to which pain 6 6= c-fiber firing. So the physicalist
can rest easy; the argument is invalid.
4. Humphrey and Modal Epistemology
But does this response really make sense? The defender of the sec-
ond premise invites us to imagine various Cartesian scenarios: perhaps
minds experiencing pain despite being disembodied, or zombie bod-
ies that lack pains despite being duplicates of our own bodies. What
we imagine seems to be a being without c-fibers experiencing a sen-
sation that feels just like our pains, or a being with c-fibers like ours
experiencing no sensations at all. But a sensation that is just like our
pains just is pain. (This is one upshot of Kripke’s famous discussion
of modal error.) How could it then be claimed that it is not pain, but
merely some counterpart of pain, that is instantiated in the occurrence
of such a sensation? Similarly, a being who feels nothing at all certainly
does not feel pain. How could it then be claimed that such a being does
in fact instantiate pain (but that the relevant fact is that her pain is not
a counterpart of ours)?
The objection bears a striking similarity to Kripke’s famous
Humphrey objection (Kripke 1980, p. 45 n. 13). Just as Kripke claimed
that Humphrey cares only whether he – he himself – might have won,
and not whether someone else like him did win, the objector is claim-
ing that we are imagining that pain – it itself – might not have been
c-fiber firing. The object of our imagination is pain, and not some
other state. The counterpart theorist should respond as follows. We
are imagining what might be the case: the contents of our imaginings
are governed by an implicit modal operator, and this modal operator is
to be analyzed counterpart-theoretically.21 So our imaginings are gov-
erned by counterpart theory, in much the same way as our ordinary
modal beliefs and desires. For example, suppose we are trying to de-
cide whether it is metaphysically possible that Humphrey wins. We
decide that it is, because we can imagine that Humphrey wins; that
is, we can imagine (we think) a world in which Humphrey wins. But
since Humphrey is world-bound, there is no such world. If the object
of our imagining is anything at all, it is a world in which a counterpart
21. It is most natural to think of the imaginings in question as fundamentally
propositional rather than objectual: we imagine that such-and-such is the
case, rather than a world in which such-and-such is the case. But those who
follow Yablo (1993, §X) and Chalmers (2002, pp. 150-151) in thinking that
objectual modal imagination is fundamental can accommodated. They must
simply suppose that the object of our modal imagination is a world accord-
ing to a counterpart relation rather than a world simpliciter.
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of Humphrey wins – a world according to which Humphrey wins. So
the seeming character of worlds we imagine is little guide to which in-
dividuals are present in them; it is at best a guide to which individuals
are present according to them.
Once we extend counterpart theory to properties, we should ex-
pect the same behavior. We are imagining that there might be a being
who has pain without c-fiber firing, and we are right: there might be
such a being. Don’t suppose, however, that there is a world in which
pain 6 6= c-fiber firing (where this claim is construed non-counterpart-
theoretically)! Given counterpart theory, this simply does not follow.
And there is no problem with modal epistemology. It is not that our
imagination is inaccurate; nor is it that we are imagining something
other than qualitative features, or qualitative features other than those
we thought. It is just that the object of modal imagination of this sort
is not the way a world is, but the way a counterpart relation represents
a world as being. Given counterpart theory, this is only to be expected.
Imagination remains a good guide to possibility construed counterpart-
theoretically, poor though it may be as a guide to explicit statements
about other worlds.
5. Resemblance and Counterparthood
So the physicalist can resist the modal argument on the basis of coun-
terpart theory, and there are some attractions to the resulting view.
But there is a prima facie problem. Counterpart relations are relations
of similarity. But what makes for similarity among properties? The
problem is especially threatening if we regard similarity as the shar-
ing of (natural) properties; on the version of the view that opts for
world-bound properties, there will be nothing to be shared, and even
counterpart relations among ordinary objects will be threatened.
The counterpart theorist has many options. So far, we have gener-
ally taken for granted Lewis’s class nominalism, according to which
properties are classes of actual (and, on Lewis’s version, possible) en-
tities. A simple version of this view might take various respects of
property similarity as primitive. Alternatively, a class nominalist could
try to explain similarity of the classes that are properties in terms of
similarity of their members.22
A more sophisticated strategy is developed in detail by Mark Heller
(1998). Heller proposes that properties can be compared by examining
their roles in their worlds, where roles consist in such features as be-
ing instantiated at various spatio-temporal points, and being bound in
particular ways by natural laws. Specifically, Heller suggests that Ram-
sey sentences describing the distribution of natural properties across
space-time can exhaustively specify possible worlds. (Indeed, Heller
sees these sentences not as merely specifying possible worlds, but as
acting as ersatz possible worlds.) For example, one world might be:
World W1 ∃P1∃P2...(< 13, 69, 12, 233 > instantiates P1, P3, P5; and <
1, 17, 234, 98 > instantiates P2, P3, P4, etc.)
Lewis-style Humean supervenience entails that the laws of nature
supervene on the distribution of perfectly natural properties across
space-time. So, given Humean supervenience, Heller’s Ramsey sen-
tences will give us laws of nature.23 Heller thus suggests that such
Ramsey sentences can be used to specify a property’s role in its world:
“To describe a property P’s role completely, we say ‘it is such that...’,
where the ellipsis is filled in with the rest of the description of the en-
tire world: P is such that it has such-and-such a distribution among
other properties P1, P2, and so on, that have so-and-so distributions”
(1998, p. 301). For example, suppose that P is the witness for P1 in
the World W1 example described above. Using the familiar λ-abstract
notation, we can describe P’s role as follows:
22. There is reason to doubt that this strategy will work for the world-bound
class nominalist (see Armstrong (1989, pp. 52-3)). But the Lewisian class
nominalist has more options (see Lewis (1999a, p. 16)).
23. In fact, Heller would need to assume the necessity of Humean superve-
nience, which Lewis does not endorse (see Lewis (1986b, p. x)). If this is
deemed problematic, we could explicitly specify the laws in the Ramsey
sentence. I follow Heller in ignoring this complication.
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(10) P is such that it satisfies λP1∃P2...(< 13, 69, 12, 233 > instantiates
P1, P3, P5 and < 1, 17, 234, 98 > instantiates P2, P3, P4, etc.)
It is easy to imagine properties in other worlds playing similar or dif-
ferent roles (i.e., having similar or different patterns of instantiation,
and/or similar or different nomological roles). Moreover, it is easy to
imagine trading off different respects of similarity with respect to role
to produce different similarity rankings, and hence different counter-
part relations, in the way needed to motivate the Lewisian response to
the modal argument.
On Heller’s view, the nature of properties can be captured by spec-
ifying their distribution. Many metaphysicians may feel that there is
more to the nature of properties. Fortunately, our counterpart the-
ory is compatible with many other views. For example, the propo-
nent of Armstrong-style universals could combine counterpart theory
with Armstrong’s (e.g., 1989, pp. 102-107) partial identity account of
similarity among properties. Armstrong claims that there are complex
properties which have atomic universals as their parts.24 Resemblance
between these properties is a matter of partial identity (i.e., sharing
parts). The counterpart theorist could adopt this theory if she sup-
poses that atomic universals are trans-world individuals. Resemblance
among non-atomic properties (which might or might not be world-
bound) would consist in sharing of parts.25 (A similar account could be
based on a Shoemaker-style causal theory of properties, taking causal
powers to be genuinely shared across worlds, and properties to be
similar to the extent that they bestow similar sets of powers. See fn.
24. On Armstrong’s view, only the fundamental physical properties are atomic
universals. I am assuming that the physicalist will not treat pain or c-fiber
firing as fundamental physical properties, and hence will hold that pain/c-
fiber firing is complex.
25. This sort of view would lead to the (possibly attractive) result that the iden-
tity relation is the only eligible counterpart relation for atomic universals
(since atomic universals have only themselves as parts). See fn. 20 above for
discussion.
18 above for another reason that the proponent of the causal theory of
properties should find counterpart theory attractive.)
Trope theorists, who deny that there are multiply instantiable uni-
versals but admit that there are particular properties, could also accept
the sort of counterpart theory described in this paper.26 In order to
resist Kripke’s modal argument against token identities (e.g., this very
pain = this c-fiber firing), one would have to postulate counterparts of
individual tropes. In order to resist Kripke’s modal argument against
type identities (on which we have been focusing), the trope theorist
would have to postulate counterparts of whatever entities she takes
types to be. On one plausible view (Williams 1953, p. 9), types like pain
are sets of resembling tropes. Although it would be possible in princi-
ple for the modal realist to take pain to be a class of actual and merely
possible tropes, this view is unmotivated. The Lewisian class nominalist
is motivated to include merely possible entities in order to distinguish
actually coextensive properties such as being a renate and being a cordate
(though see section 3.1.1 above). But the trope theorist can maintain
that (for example) my being a renate is a distinct trope from my be-
ing a cordate, and thus that the set of all of the being a renate tropes is
distinct from the set of all of the being a cordate tropes.
Resemblance on this view is an unanalyzed primitive.27 But tropes,
like other particulars, can be similar and dissimilar to different degrees
and in different respects. For example, a dark shade of blue might
resemble a light shade of blue with respect to hue, and a dark shade of
red with respect to brightness. On the trope theorist’s view, this is not
26. See Schaffer (2001) for one example of a trope theorist who accepts coun-
terpart theory.
27. Some trope theorists may wish to treat exact resemblance as the only un-
analyzed primitive, and to analyze inexact resemblance in terms of exact
resemblance, perhaps along the lines of Armstrong’s proposal discussed
above (e.g., two complex tropes inexactly resemble each other if and only
if they have parts that exactly resemble each other; see Armstrong (1989,
pp. 124-5)). I set this view aside, as for our purposes it does not differ
interestingly from the Armstrong view applied to universals. In any case,
many trope theorists deny that inexact resemblance should be analyzed; see
Campbell (1990, pp. 81-85), and, for discussion, Armstrong (1989, p. 125).
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a matter of the dark shade and the light shade sharing a higher-order
hue property, any more than the resemblance of two particulars is a
matter of sharing a universal. Different respects of similarity among
tropes could generate different counterpart relations. And similarity
among classes of tropes could be analyzed in terms of similarity of
their members.28
Moreover, there is an independent motivation for the trope theorist
to be a counterpart theorist. The trope theorist claims that “red” picks
out the set of red tropes. Wolterstorff (1973, pp. 176-81) and Loux (2006,
p. 79) object that since sets have their members necessarily, the trope
theorist is committed to the claim that red could not have different
membership, and in particular that it could not have more or fewer
members than it actually does. But this entails that there could not be
more or fewer red things than there actually are.
Counterpart theory gives a way out. According to the counterpart
theorist, de re modal claims about the set of all red tropes will involve
different counterpart relations in different contexts. Thus for example,
if I say, “Sets have their members necessarily, so red has its members
necessarily,” this will tend to make salient a counterpart relation ac-
cording to which all counterparts of red have the members red ac-
tually has. But if I say, “There might have been more red things, so
red might have had more members,” this will tend to make salient a
counterpart relation according to which some counterparts of red have
more members than red actually has. As with the modal argument,
both utterances can be true, and the appearance of conflict is mere
appearance.
6. Physicalism
Let us suppose that the foregoing objections are answered, and thus
that we have developed a system that can validate (in some contexts)
28. See Armstrong (1989, pp. 123-4) for how this analysis avoids the difficulties
that plague the analogous project for the class nominalist.
the claim that necessarily, pain = c-fiber firing. There remains a seri-
ous question as to whether this system can be considered a version of
physicalism. For it is widely agreed that if physicalism is true, then the
facts about the mind must supervene on the physical facts as a mat-
ter of metaphysical necessity. Indeed, many have attempted to define
physicalism in terms of such supervenience. But some supervenience
doctrines stand in tension with the view I have described. Consider,
for example, the following claim (from Kim (1998, p. 9)):
(11) Necessarily, for any mental property M, if anything has M at time
t, there exists a physical base (or subvenient) property P such that
it has P at t, and necessarily anything that has P at a time has M at
that time.
The view I have described predicts that in some contexts, (11) will be
false. For consider a context in which mental terms and physical terms
are responsive to different counterpart relations. In this context, (11)
will be paraphrased as something like (12):
(12) For any world w, for any mental property M, if anything has M at
time t in w, there exists a physical base (or subvenient) property P
such that it has P at t in w, and for any world w′ anything that has
a property that is a counterpart of P at w′ according to counterpart
relation C1 at a time has a property that is a counterpart of M
according to counterpart relation C2 at w′ at that time.
Since C1 need not be identical to C2, there is no reason to expect (12) to
be true. For example, suppose that c-fiber firing is the putative physi-
cal base for pain, and that “pain” and “c-fiber firing” are responsive to
different counterpart relations. Then it is true to say, “Possibly, some
things have the property of having firing c-fibers at t but lack the prop-
erty of being in pain at t.” This guarantees that it will be false to say,
“Necessarily, anything that has the property of having firing c-fibers at
a time has the property of being in pain at that time,” and this guar-
antees that (11) will express a falsehood.
There are two ways to respond to this challenge. The first de-
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pends on the assumption that properties are not world-bound. We
can begin by noting that supervenience claims can be stated in two
ways: using modal operators, or using explicit quantification over
worlds. The counterpart-theoretic view cannot respect supervenience,
if it is stated using modal operators. This is because we evaluate
modal claims by ‘translating’ them into claims involving counterpart
relations and quantification over worlds, and in some contexts, the
counterpart-theoretic translations will be false. But some versions of
the counterpart-theoretic view can respect supervenience, if it is stated
in terms of explicit quantification over worlds. For example, Frank
Jackson (1998, p. 12) has argued that physicalism is the doctrine that
any minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter
(where a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a world that du-
plicates all of the physical features of our world, and adds nothing
to these.) This view involves no modal expressions; there is thus no
need for counterpart-theoretic translation, and any context-sensitivity
resulting from the counterpart relation is irrelevant. Moreover, on the
assumption that mental properties are identical to physical properties,
and given trans-world properties, Jackson’s physicalism is very plausi-
bly true.29 Similarly, given trans-world properties, (11) can be replaced
by (13):
(13) Necessarily, for any mental property M, if anything has M at time
t, there exists a physical base (or subvenient) property P such that
it has P at t, and in every world w anything that has P at a time has
M at that time.
(13) will not be translated as (12): since the second clause explicitly
quantifies over worlds, there is no call for a counterpart-theoretic trans-
lation and the context-sensitivity of the counterpart relation is irrele-
vant.
29. In fact, world-bound properties will also vindicate Jackson’s physicalism,
but only by trivializing it: since duplicating our world requires duplicating
the properties instantiated in it, and since properties are ex hypothesis world-
bound, there will be no duplicates of our world.
It might be thought that there is something unpalatable in treat-
ing supervenience in terms of quantification over worlds rather than
modal operators. But from the point of view of counterpart theory,
explicit quantification over worlds is a much more natural way to cap-
ture ontological claims such as physicalism. The counterpart theorist
holds that modal claims are made true by two factors: the facts about
worlds, and a counterpart relation. Now the ontologist is interested in
what there is, and what there is at other worlds may be relevant to
her inquiry. But it is hard to see why she should care about counter-
part relations. In effect, modal claims see worlds through the lens of a
counterpart relation; for the purposes of ontology, the lens introduces
distortions that should be set aside.
A further objection might try to use a modal argument involving
direct quantification over worlds against this account of physicalism,
in something like the following way:
1. If physicalism is true, then in all worlds pain = c-fiber firing. (From
the definition of physicalism.)
2. It is not the case that in all worlds pain = c-fiber firing. (Because in
some worlds there are disembodied spirits that have pain without
c-fiber firing, and in some worlds there are zombies that have c-fiber
firing without pain.)
3. Therefore, it is not the case that pain = c-fiber firing.
The physicalist should deny that we have reason to believe the second
premise. Recall my discussion of the Humphrey objection above: our
modal imagination is fundamentally directed at counterpart-theoretic
modality. It gives us reason to believe modal claims: in effect, claims
about possible worlds seen through counterpart relations. It does not
directly give us reason to believe claims about possible worlds.
I said that there were two ways to respond to the challenge
that our counterpart-theoretic account cannot accommodate superve-
nience. The second response is to give up supervenience as a necessary
condition on physicalism. The root idea of physicalism is monism: the
idea that there is only one type of thing. Supervenience has been sug-
philosophers’ imprint - 17 - vol. 11, no. 13 (november 2011)
derek ball Property Identities and Modal Arguments
gested as a way to capture this idea. But as long as identity theory is
still on the table, there is a simpler way. It is hard to see how a world
in which every instantiated natural property is identical to a physical
property could be physicalistically unacceptable.30 If the physicalist
can maintain that every instantiated natural property is identical to a
physical property, then (I claim) physicalism is saved, even if superve-
nience fails.
The analogy here is again with Lewis’s account of the person–body
identity and the GWR–GWR- identity. Lewis wrote, “I am offered a
trade: instead of a multiplicity of kinds of thing I can have a mul-
tiplicity of counterpart relations” (1983b, p. 53). The physicalist, too,
can avail herself of this trade. If physicalism is a matter of there being
only one kind of thing (or one kind of property), then we can defend
physicalism by postulating a multiplicity of counterpart relations.
7. Conclusion
There was a time when many philosophers held that mind-body iden-
tity claims were true only contingently, and thus could not be refuted
by the mere possibility of their failure. Kripke showed that this view
cannot be accepted by those who hold certain semantic commitments.
These commitments are controversial, but the subsequent literature on
the modal argument has failed thoroughly to consider alternatives.
The metaphilosophical moral of Kripke’s discussion – that “our views
30. Why the restriction to natural properties? Suppose we provisionally accept
Lewis’s class nominalism, according to which properties are sets of pos-
sibilia. Classes of possibilia are abundant: there is a class for any coherent
predicate of any language, and perhaps some that cannot be captured lin-
guistically (at least not in any finite way). Each actual individual is a mem-
ber of indefinitely many such classes, and so, if these classes are properties,
has indefinitely many such properties. Some of these classes will contain
non-physical non-actual entities, so some of these properties will be non-
physical. But this should not count against physicalism. What matters is
that all the properties that enter into causal laws and the like are physical.
I may be a member of sets that contain all sorts of merely possible spirits
and ectoplasms; the physicalist is unscathed as long as all of these sets are
sufficiently gruesome.
on [naming and necessity – that is, the metaphysics and semantics of
modality] really have wide-ranging implications” (Kripke 1980, p. 22)
– has been all but forgotten. As much recent work has shown, the
modal argument raises interesting issues in modal epistemology. But
the truth of physicalism does not turn only on these issues. Physicalists
have options in modal metaphysics and semantics that deserve further
exploration.31
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